Skip to content
🚧 Early alpha — building the foundation. See the roadmap →

Security & GRC framework corpus

Updated

This is the directory of security & GRC frameworks worth crosswalking — scoped to Crosswalker’s launch problem domains: cybersecurity, information security, GRC, risk management, internal audit, and regulatory compliance. Each entry links to a durable home/landing page (not a download URL — those rot), notes its license, and whether usable source data is in hand.

Public mapping binding last verified: 2026-10-30 against the deterministic public demo and tests/cli/demo-smoke.test.ts. This verifies mitigation endpoint resolution only, not other corpus acquisition or licence statuses.

The landscape — frameworks worth crosswalking

Section titled “The landscape — frameworks worth crosswalking”

Status = whether usable source data is in hand: ✅ acquired · ⚠️ partial (a crosswalk or subset) · 📥 still to source. (Whether a framework has been ingested and tested through Crosswalker is a separate status that comes online as we run the ingestion → mapping pipeline — see “Using these in practice” above.) License: 🟢 public / free · 🟡 registration / restrictive-CC · 🔴 purchase / copyrighted. Source links go to durable landing pages, not download URLs.

Threat-informed & adversary frameworks (MITRE family + friends)

Section titled “Threat-informed & adversary frameworks (MITRE family + friends)”
FrameworkWhat it isLicStatusSource
MITRE ATT&CK (Enterprise/Mobile/ICS)Adversary tactics & techniques; public demo imports full Enterprise v16.1 plus a separate mitigation set; Mobile/ICS remain later imports🟢✅attack.mitre.org
MITRE D3FENDDefensive countermeasures ontology; flat catalog and two mapping tables imported in the public demo🟢✅d3fend.mitre.org
MITRE EngageAdversary engagement / cyber deception & denial (ex-Shield)🟢✅engage.mitre.org
MITRE Fight Fraud Framework (F3)Fraud adversary tactics & techniques for financial services; reuses some ATT&CK ids (details)🟢✅ctid.mitre.org/fightfraud
MITRE CAPECCommon Attack Pattern Enumeration🟢✅capec.mitre.org
MITRE CWECommon Weakness Enumeration🟢✅cwe.mitre.org
CVE / NVD + CISA KEVKnown + exploited vulnerabilities🟢⚠️ ATT&CK↔CVE + KEV↔ATT&CKnvd.nist.gov
MITRE ATLASAdversarial AI/ML threat matrix🟢✅atlas.mitre.org
MITRE CARCyber Analytics Repository (detections)🟢✅car.mitre.org
MITRE VERISIncident classification taxonomy🟢✅verisframework.org
CTID resource packsATT&CK mappings + threat-informed-defense projects; 800-53 to ATT&CK 16.1 imported in the public demo, other capability packs deferred🟢✅ctid.mitre.org
Lockheed Cyber Kill Chain7-stage intrusion model🟡✅lockheedmartin.com
Diamond ModelIntrusion analysis model🟢✅activeresponse.org
FrameworkWhat it isLicStatusSource
NIST CSF 2.0Functions / categories / subcategories🟢✅nist.gov/cyberframework
NIST 800-53 r5Control catalog + assessment🟢✅csrc.nist.gov
NIST 800-171CUI protection (→ CMMC)🟢✅csrc.nist.gov
NIST SSDF (800-218)Secure software development🟢✅csrc.nist.gov/projects/ssdf
NIST 800-207Zero Trust Architecture🟢✅csrc.nist.gov
NIST Privacy FrameworkPrivacy risk (CSF-shaped)🟢📥nist.gov/privacy-framework
CIS Controls v8.118 controls / 153 safeguards🟡✅cisecurity.org/controls
CIS Benchmarks (~20)Per-technology hardening (AWS, Azure, GCP, K8s, M365, SQL Server, …)🟡✅cisecurity.org
ISO/IEC 27001 + 27002ISMS requirements + Annex A control catalog🔴✅ 27001:2022 (+Amd 1:2024) + 27002:2022iso.org
ISO 27701 / 27017 / 27018Privacy (PIMS) / cloud / PII ISMS extensions🔴⚠️ have 27701:2025; 27017/27018 missingiso.org
Secure Controls Framework175+ framework hub via STRM (+ maturity & risk models)🟡✅securecontrolsframework.com
CSA Cloud Controls MatrixCloud control framework🟡✅ CCM 4.1 (via CTID pack)cloudsecurityalliance.org
AICPA SOC 2 / TSCTrust Services Criteria🔴✅aicpa-cima.com
FrameworkWhat it isLicStatusSource
CRI Profile (v2.0–2.2)Financial-sector spine + mappings catalog + DORA / 800-53 / ATT&CK crosswalks + FS-AI-RMF🔴✅cyberriskinstitute.org
FFIEC IT HandbookUS FI examination booklets🟢✅ithandbook.ffiec.gov
FedRAMPUS gov cloud authorization🟢✅fedramp.gov
PCI DSS v4.0.1Payment card security🔴✅pcisecuritystandards.org
HIPAA Security RuleUS healthcare PHI🟢✅hhs.gov/hipaa
CMMCUS DoD contractor maturity🟢✅dodcio.defense.gov/CMMC
CISA CPGCross-sector performance goals🟢✅cisa.gov
HITRUST CSF v11.8Healthcare-centric certifiable framework🔴✅hitrustalliance.net
NERC CIPEnergy / grid critical infrastructure🟢📥nerc.com
SWIFT CSPFinancial messaging security🔴📥swift.com
Section titled “Regulatory & legal obligations (obligation-centric)”
RegulationJurisdictionLicStatusSource
DORAEU financial digital resilience🟢✅EUR-Lex (ELI 2022/2554)
NIS2EU critical-entity security🟢📥EUR-Lex (ELI 2022/2555)
GDPREU data protection🟢⚠️ TSC→GDPR crosswalkEUR-Lex (ELI 2016/679)
NYDFS Part 500US (NY) financial cyber🟢📥dfs.ny.gov
SEC cyber disclosure (33-11216)US public-company disclosure (8-K Item 1.05 + Reg S-K Item 106)🟢✅Federal Register (2023-16194)
FrameworkWhat it isLicStatusSource
NIST 800-30 / 800-39Risk assessment + risk-mgmt process🟢📥csrc.nist.gov
ISO 31000 / 27005Risk mgmt principles / infosec risk🔴⚠️ have 31000:2018; 27005 missingiso.org
FAIR / Open FAIRQuantitative cyber-risk taxonomy🟡📥fairinstitute.org
NIST AI RMFAI risk management (AI 100-1)🟢✅nist.gov
CRI FS-AI-RMFFinancial-services AI risk & control matrix (stages 1–3 + tier 4)🔴✅cyberriskinstitute.org
ISO 42001AI management system🔴📥iso.org

Application, product & supply-chain security

Section titled “Application, product & supply-chain security”
FrameworkWhat it isLicStatusSource
OWASP Top 10Web app risk list (Top 10 ↔ CWE via OSIB YAML export)🟢✅owasp.org · GitHub
OWASP ASVS v5.0App security verification standard🟢✅owasp.org
OWASP SAMM v2Software assurance maturity🟢✅owaspsamm.org
OWASP MASVSMobile app security🟢✅mas.owasp.org
SLSASupply-chain integrity levels🟢✅slsa.dev
BSIMMSoftware security maturity (descriptive)🟡📥bsimm.com
FrameworkWhat it isLicStatusSource
IIA Global Internal Audit Standards (2024)Internal-audit profession standards — 5 domains / 15 principles / 52 standards (PDF only, no structured file)🔴✅theiia.org/standards
IIA Topical RequirementsMandatory audit requirement sets — Cybersecurity, Third-Party, Org Resilience (crosswalk to NIST/CRI/DORA)🔴✅theiia.org
COSO Internal Control + ERMGovernance / internal-control / ERM🔴📥coso.org
COBIT 2019IT governance & management (objectives/practices/activities XLSX in the toolkit)🔴✅isaca.org/cobit
IIA Three Lines ModelRisk governance roles🟢✅theiia.org

Status last verified: 2026-10-30 — scoped to ATT&CK v16.1, D3FEND and their held public crosswalk source bindings (scripts/demo-build.mjs, the source files named in the data-sources reference, and tests/cli/demo-smoke.test.ts). Other landscape acquisition rows are unchanged.

The demo now uses the full Enterprise v16.1 technique catalog and separate mitigation notes, alongside NIST CSF 2.0, SP 800-53 r5 and F3. D3FEND adds a flat defensive-technique catalog, NIST control mappings and ATT&CK mitigation mappings. CTID’s 800-53-to-ATT&CK set targets 16.1. The CSF concept crosswalk is checked against the existing CSF mapping before deciding whether a separate set adds information. Source counts, download links, licences, transformation rules and the relation-field projection gap live in the canonical source reference.

Public crosswalk inputDemo import status
CTID SP 800-53 Rev. 5 to ATT&CK 16.1Separate publisher mapping set; exact duplicate and non_mappable rows counted separately
CSF 2.0 concept crosswalk to SP 800-53Same pairs as the existing CSF-to-800-53 set; not imported separately
D3FEND NIST semantic tableSeparate conservative related mappings; publisher relation direction unverified
ATT&CK mitigation-to-D3FEND tableSeparate mapping set; empty mapping cells counted and skipped. All endpoints resolve after collision-based identity selection; no publisher identifiers are rewritten

Release follow-up: fetch the current 800-53 rev5 release as a new set. The demo CSV does not record a minor release and lacks IA-13; the held OSCAL archive’s revision history identifies IA-13 as a 5.1.1 addition, and its current catalog is 5.2.0. Reuse that held archive where appropriate rather than guessing the CSV’s version. The separate Mobile ATT&CK import planned with the STIX reader can resolve the publisher’s Mobile-matrix endpoint in its Enterprise mapping. Neither gap authorizes retargeting identifiers or inventing stub concepts (sources: Frameworks/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog_load.csv, the held nist.gov-SP800-53_rev5 archive metadata, and Frameworks/mobile-attack.json; source-reference context).

Status last verified: 2026-10-29 — the F3 files below were downloaded from the pinned upstream revision and checked against both worksheets and the demo output. Other landscape rows retain their historical acquisition status; this is not a re-verification of the whole corpus.

The full public F3 v1.2 source now ships in the repository, rather than relying on a local download or the synthetic test fixture. All files are pinned to upstream commit 281be11eed4670e763a2ed57dd2274948f54a523, downloaded 2026-10-29, under Apache-2.0.

Tracked filePurpose and verified content
Frameworks/f3-excel-v1.2.xlsxPublisher’s v1.2 workbook: 138 Techniques rows, including 41 multi-tactic rows and 55 sub-techniques; 8 Tactics rows
Frameworks/LICENSES/mitre-f3-LICENSE.txtUnmodified upstream Apache License 2.0; also copied into the generated F3 demo folder as LICENSE.txt, and as LICENSE.md (same text in a code block) for hosts that accept only Markdown
Frameworks/mitre-f3-source.jsonUpstream SHA, download date, source paths, file digests and verified counts

Counts source: the tracked workbook’s Techniques and Tactics sheets, pinned in Frameworks/mitre-f3-source.json and checked by tests/mitre-f3-demo-recipes.test.ts. The data-sources reference explains the shipped linked default and the preserved previous default. The 2026-10-29 follow-up records the move from sample rows to the full linked catalog without changing existing recipe digests.

Section titled “Licensing & copyright — what Crosswalker can share”

This corpus gives broad licence tiers across the landscape. For the supported sources Crosswalker imports today, use the neighbouring framework data sources reference for publisher-specific cautions, exact acquisition routes, and the distinction between obtaining a source and sharing generated notes.

Raw framework sources split three ways for handling:

TierFrameworksHandling
🟢 Public domain / freeNIST, MITRE, FedRAMP, FFIEC, HIPAA, CMMC, CISA, DORA + EU lawcommit-safe
🟡 Registration / restrictive CCCIS (Controls + Benchmarks), Secure Controls Frameworklocal only
🔴 CopyrightedCRI, ISO, AICPA / SOC 2, PCI, HITRUST, COBIT, COSO, IIAlocal only

The raw corpus lives at repo-root Frameworks/ — local-by-default (fail-closed gitignore); copyrighted source files go in Frameworks/_licensed/ and are never committed.

The part that matters for using them: Crosswalker stores the transform logic (the import recipes + crosswalk mappings) and your derived output (paraphrased concept notes + crosswalk junction notes) — not the raw copyrighted text. So the mapping logic stays shareable even when the source standard isn’t, which is how copyrighted inputs (CRI, ISO, PCI) can feed a crosswalk graph you can still publish. That’s the schema-as-primitive idea.